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SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATION
A... problem is to make adequate provision for petty litiga-
tion, to provide for disposing quickly, inexpensively, and justly
of the litigation of the poor, for the collection of debts in a shift-
ing population, and for the great volume of small controversies
which a busy, crowded population, diversified in race and lan-
guage, necessarily engenders. It is here that the administration
of justice touches immediately the greatest number of people.
Roscoe Pound'
Small claims courts have been in operation in the United States for over
sixty years.2 They were established to function as inexpensive, efficient, and
convenient forums for resolving claims which could not be brought eco-
nomically in ordinary civil courts because of the costs and delays accom-
panying ordinary civil court proceedings.
3
Small claims courts also reduce administrative delays by resolving a
large volume of claims. For example, the District of Columbia small
claims court processed 30,000 claims in 1973. 4 Despite the amount of
litigation handled by small claims courts, commentators have expressed
much dissatisfaction with their operation and practice. 5 Some commen-
tators urge abandonment of small claims courts and development
of alternative means of redress, especially for consumer disputes. 6 While
IPound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302,
315 (1913).
2 Note, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 876, 877 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as California Small Claims].
3 Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO.
L.J. 253, 259 (1968).
4 Hearings on S. 2928 Before the Subcomm. on Consumers of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce and the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1974) (statement of David
Van Knapp, counsel for the District of Columbia Project on Consumer Legal As-
sistance) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2928]. Seventy thousand claims were
filed in the New York City small claims courts in 1971. 2 STAFF STUDIES PREPARED
FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE ON SMALL CLAIMS COURTS,
App. H, at 679 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NICJ STAFF STUDIES]. The California
small claims courts recorded 360,680 claims in the fiscal year 1967-68, constituting
55 percent of the civil filings in California municipal and justice courts. Note, The
Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as Performed by the Small
Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant].
5 See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress,
66 Nw. U.L. REV. 281, 321 (1971); Haemmel, The North Carolina Small Claims
Court-An Empirical Study, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503, 508 (1973); Willging,
supra note 3, at 259.
6 See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 321. In Jones, Wanted: A New
System for Solving Consumer Grievances, 25 ARI. J. 234, 237 (1970), the author
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much of the criticism leveled at small claims courts is justified, aban-
donment of these courts as a mechanism for the redress of small claims
would be undesirable. This note will discuss ways in which small claims
courts can be reformed to become more effective mechanisms for the
resolution of small disputes. A model small claims court statute incor-
porating the suggested changes will be presented.
I. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS
A. History of Small Claims Courts
The impetus for establishment of small claims courts in the United
States came from reformers in the early twentieth century who perceived
that the American judicial system, although in theory providing all with
equal rights, failed to afford a practical remedy to most people because of
the costs and delay of litigation. 7 The reformers advocated creation of
courts to hear exclusively small claims in a summary manner to remedy
these administrative defects in the law.8
The states soon acted by creating forums for deciding small claims.
The first small claims court was judicially established by the Cleveland
Municipal Court in 1913.9 Two months later, the first statutory small
debtors' court began operation in Kansas. 10 As the small claims idea at-
tracted attention, other statewide statutory systems developed. Massachu-
setts pioneered with such a system in 1920;11 California and South Dakota
followed a year later. 12 Currently, small claims courts exist in every state,13
considered consumer grievance resolution mechanisms without even a mention of
small claims courts. The alternative to small claims courts most often suggested is
consumer arbitration. Extensive discussion of consumer arbitration is found in Eovaldi
& Gestrin, supra note 5, at 312-19, and Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of
Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 357, 369-80 (1972).
7 See, e.g., Pound, supra note 1, at 316.
8 R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 15 (2d ed. 1919); Scott, Small Causes and Poor
Litigants, 9 A.B.A.J. 457, 458 (1923).
9 California Small Claims, supra note 2, at 877.
10 R. SMITH, supra note 8, at 48.
11 MASS. STAT. ch. 553, § 1 (1920), now MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 21
(1974, Supp. 1975).
12 Smith, Small Claims Procedure Is Succeeding, 8 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 247 (June
1924). See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, SMALL CLAIMS COURT (1954,
Supp. 1959) (comprehensive account of the small claims movement from 1913 to
1940); Northrop, Small Claims Courts and Conciliation Tribunals: A Bibliography,
33 LAW LIB. J. 39 (1940) (pre-1940 bibliography of statutes and articles relating to
small claims courts).
13 See Buyer v. Seller in Small Claims Court, 36 CONSUMER REP. 624, 629-31
(1971) for a compilation of small claims courts in the United States. The author's
compilation indicates that three states, Colorado, Indiana, and Nebraska, had no
small claims courts at that time. Small claims courts in Colorado have since been
established by local court rule. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 286 n.137. In-
diana and Nebraska have recently established statutory small claims courts. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 33-11.6-1-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-521 et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1974, Supp. 1975).
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but only thirty-two states have comprehensive statutory small claims court
systems.14 In the remainder of the states, local court rules provide for estab-
lishment of small claims courts. In spite of the proliferation of small claims
courts, an estimated 41 million people, largely in rural areas, have no ready
access to this type of judicial forum. 15
14ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.040 (1975); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 116 et seq. (Deering
1972, Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-14 et seq. (Supp. 1976); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 633-28 et seq. (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 1-2301 et seq. (Supp. 1974);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 277 et seq. (1968, Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §
33-11.6-1-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 631.1 et seq. (Supp. 1976);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2701 et seq. (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
7451 et seq. (1964, Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 21 et seq.
(1974, Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.8401 et seq. (Supp. 1975); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 491.01 et seq. (1971, Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-521 et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1974, Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 73.010 et seq., Rule 80A et seq.
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503:1 et seq. (1968, Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:6-41 et seq. (1952, Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-1 et seq. (1953, Supp.
1973); N.Y.C. CIVIL CT. ACT § 1801 et seq. (1963, Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNIFORM
DIST. CT. ACT § 1801 et seq. (1963, Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT
§ 1801 et seq. (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-210 et seq. (1969, Supp. 1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-01 et seq. (1974, Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1925.01 et seq. (1973, Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1751 et seq. (Supp.
1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 46.405 et seq., § 55.011 et seq. (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 10-16-1 et seq. (1969, Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-39-1
et seq. (1967, Supp. 1974); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a (1971, Supp. 1975);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-1 et seq. (1953, Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5531
et seq. (1958, Supp. 1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 12.40.010 et seq. (1962, Supp.
1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 299.01 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-562
et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
The Louisiana constitution provides for establishment of a small claims court in
New Orleans. LA. CONST. art. 7, § 91 (Supp. 1976).
Florida once had a statutory system of small claims courts (ch. 26920, § 1 et seq.,
[19511 Fla. Laws 1108) but in a recent court reorganization the Small Claims Act
was repealed. Ch. 72-404, § 30, [1972] Fla. Laws 1395. Section 9 of ch. 72-404, [1972]
Fla. Laws 1402 amended FLA. STAT. ANN. § 34.01 (Supp. 1975) to give county courts
the jurisdiction previously exercised by the small claims courts. There are no longer
any specific statutory provisions governing small claims; small claims procedure is
now determined by local court rule.
Maryland's only statutory provision relating to small claims provides that in civil
actions in the district court, where the amount in controversy is $1,000 or less, no
formal pleadings are required. MD. ANN. CODE CJ § 6-403 (1974).
Georgia has created a number of small claims courts by local laws passed through
the legislature but not included as part of the legislative compilation. See the note in
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 24, pt. IV (1971, Supp. 1975) for a list of local small claims court
acts and a reference to their enactment in the Georgia Session Laws.
Some states provide in their statutory small claims court acts that rules will be
established by state or local court rule. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-15
(Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 21 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
491.04(3) (Supp. 1976). These rules are not found in the statutory compilation.
Small claims courts have also been established by statute in the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1301 et seq., § 16-3901
et seq. (1973); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32, § 3031 et seq. (1968); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4,
§ 112 (Supp. 1975), tit. 5, App. IV, Rule 61 et seq. (1966).
15 SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, THE CONSUMER CONTROVERSIES RESOLUTION
ACT, S. REP. No. 1164, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974). In order to make small claims
courts and other consumer redress mechanisms available and accessible to every
person, Senators Moss, Magnuson, and Tunney introduced S. 2928 before the 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Upon failure of this bill to pass in the 93d Congress the same
Senators reintroduced it in substantially the same form as S. 2069 in the 94th Cong.,
Small Claims Courts
B. Purposes of Small Claims Courts
Since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, the English and American
systems of jurisprudence have sought to make justice available to all, re-
gardless of financial means.16 To this end, small claims courts attempt to
provide legal redress for meritorious claimants with small claims who are
likely to be discouraged by the delay, expense, and procedural technicalities
of full trial proceedings.17 These courts seek to render justice that is speedy,
simple, fair, and inexpensive"' by streamlining procedures and conducting
hearings informally at a minimal cost to the litigants.1 9
Small claims courts have often been conceived of as forums to benefit
primarily the poor by reducing their sense of alienation from society and
restoring their confidence in the courts.20 Yet, the purpose of these courts
need not be so limited.21 Since the costs associated with civil litigation pre-
1st Sess. (1975). The proposed bill authorizes grants to states to establish and main-
tain consumer redress mechanisms. Section 8 establishes standards which state systems
of consumer redress must meet in order to be eligible for federal funding. In addi-
tion to the general standards for compliance, specific standards are mandated for
small claims courts.
The proposed Consumer Controversies Resolution Act was written partially in
response to the recommendation of the board of directors of the National Institute
of Consumer Justice that federal funding be provided to stimulate the development
of adequate small claims courts. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CONSUMER
JUSTICE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES 25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REDRESS
OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES]. The board of directors represented a range of interests
from consumer groups to businesses involved in the sale of consumer goods. The
recommendations received the support of a substantial majority of the board. Id. at 39
(separate statement of Antonin Scalia, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the
United States).
16 Willging, supra note 3, at 255. Willging quotes the Magna Carta, ch. 40 (1215):
"To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay, right or justice." Id.
17 Id. at 259.
18 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 13. The court in Sanderson v. Niemann,
17 Cal. 2d 573, 110 P.2d 1025 (1941) discussed the nature and function of the small
claims court:
It is apparent that such a court was established in order to offer a means
of obtaining speedy settlement of claims of small amounts. The theory
behind its organization is that only by escaping from the complexity and
delay of the normal course of litigation could anything be gained in a
legal proceeding which may involve a small sum. Consequently, the
small claims court functions informally and expeditiously. The chief
characteristics of its proceedings are that there are no attorneys, no
pleadings, and no legal rules of evidence; there are no juries, and no
formal findings are made on the issues presented. At the hearings the
presentation of evidence may be sharply curtailed, and the proceed-
ings are often terminated in a short space of time. The awards-
although made in accordance with substantive law-are often based
on the application of common sense; and the spirit of compromise
and conciliation attends the proceedings.
17 Cal. 2d at 273, 110 P.2d at 1030.
19 Comment, Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
47, 47-48 (August 1969).
'0 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 383, 173 P.2d
38 (1946); The Persecution and InItimidation of the Low-Income Litigant, supra
note 4, at 1669.
21 See Small Claimns Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 19, at 48.
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vent people of all means from asserting small claims in civil courts,22 small
claims courts constitute effective forums for all persons in need of such
redress.
23
C. The Nature of the Proceedings
Small claims court procedure represents a major shift away from the
Anglo-American adversarial system of justice.2 4 The adversary model pre-
supposes a triangle of forces: two opposing advocates appealing for their
clients to a disinterested third party.2 5 This system functions adequately
only where both parties to the dispute. are represented by able counsel.
However, in small claims courts frequently either one or both litigants is
not represented by counsel because the parties cannot afford legal serv-
ices, 26 because the amount of the claim does not justify the expense of an
attorney, or because attorneys are prohibited by statute from appearing.
The adversarial model, therefore, is frequently inapplicable to small
claims court procedure.
The direction of present small claims court legislation has been towards
implicitly sanctioning an inquisitorial process.27 When lawyers are not
involved in the proceedings, the judge must assume the roles of impartial
arbiter and advocate for both plaintiff and defendant.2 8 The burden thus
placed on the judicial decisionmaker often results in either an uninformed
judgment if the judge remains passive, or a biased decision if the judge
assumes an inquisitorial posture.2 9 It is questionable, therefore, whether
inquisitorial proceedings can adequately assure justice to the participants.
30
To prevent small claims adjudication from degenerating into an inquisi-
torial process, adversary safeguards may need to be implemented. Yet
the cost of representation by counsel, and the potential for unfairness
if only one party to the proceedings is represented by an attorney, sug-
gest that the traditional adversary model is impractical for small claims
22 Regarding consumer disputes, one commentator has noted that the cost of suit
in a civil court is usually greater than the recovery sought. Leff, Injury, Ignorance,
and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1970). Leff
states: "[Ilt is usually economically rational for [the consumer] just to abandon his
claim." Id. at 22.
23 See Comment, Small Claims Courts in Texas: Paradise Lost, 47 TEXAS L. REV.
448, 449 (1969).
24 Adams, The Small Claims Court and the Adversary Process: More Problems of
Function and Form, 51 CAN. B. REV. 583, 604 (1973); Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra
note 5, at 321.
25C. SHELDON, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL PROCESS: MODELS AND APPROACHES 4
(1974).
26 Adams, supra note 24, at 602.
27 Id. at 608.
28 1d. at 596.
29 Id. at 602-03. See Adams, supra note 24, for an extensive discussion of the
adversarial and inquisitorial models as applied to the small claims court. Adams con-
centrates on the theoretical underpinnings of the adjudicatory process with only
limited consideration of how small claims courts should actually be designed.
Adams notes that designing a small claims court that does not operate as an in-
quisitorial process may not be worth the cost. Id. at 605.
30 See note 112 and accompanying text infra.
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courts.31 A small claims court, with the judge assuming an important
role but with some adversarial features, may be the best way to produce
the efficient and inexpensive justice which the advocates of small claims
courts envision.
3 2
II. TOWARDS A MODEL SMALL CLAIMS
COURT SYSTEM
Small claims courts have by no means been universally successful as
forums for simple, inexpensive, and speedy adjudication of small claims.
Critics charge that the courts have failed to provide large-scale redress
for small grievances and instead, have become collection agencies for
commercial creditors.3 3 Nevertheless, the experience of some successful
small claims courts suggests that with procedural reforms and continued
experimentation small claims courts can be improved to meet the needs
for which they were designed.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Amount in Controversy-Because small claims court proceed-
ings are informal, all small claims court statutes set jurisdictional limits.
These limits range from $150 in Texas3 4 to $2,000 in New Mexico. 35
Probably the primary factor in setting the jurisdictional limit is the
weighing of the minor nature of the claim and the informality of the
small claims proceedings against the constitutional safeguards which
should prevail where major disputes are to be resolved.3 6 However,
because constitutional protection for cases heard in small claims court
can be provided by allowing a trial de novo on appeal, 37 this considera-
tion need not be determinative of the jurisdictional limit. Moreover, the
dollar amount of a claim, which is often thought of as an indication of the
claim's complexity and is used to set the small claims court limit,3 8 can be
31 See the discussion of representation by attorneys at notes 89-94 and accompany-
ing text infra.
32 See the discussion of the role of the judge at notes 106-16 and accompanying
text infra and the discussion of the use of legal paraprofessionals at notes 95-97 and
102-05 and accompanying text infra.
33 Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 321; Willging, supra note 3, at 259.
34TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a (1971). The jurisdictional limit is $150
for the recovery of money and $200 for recovery of wages or salary earned, or
labor performed under a contract of employment.
35 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-1 (1953). Most other states have jurisdictional limits of
$1,000 or less. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-15 (Supp. 1976) ($750); IDAHO
CODE § 1-2301 (Supp. 1974) ($300); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-522(1) (Cum. Supp.
1974) ($500); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1801 (Supp. 1975) ($1,000).
36 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 40; Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Law-
yer-Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV.
448, 468 (1961).
3
7 See notes 98-101 and accompanying text infra.
38 Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 19, at 63. The complexity
rationale is used in ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.040 (1975), which states that an action shall
not be heard as a small claim if important or unusual points of law are involved.
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reduced in importance by enacting express statutory provisions stating
that complex cases falling within the jurisdictional limit may be removed
to the civil court with concurrent jurisdiction.
39
The jurisdictional limit should be based on an assessment of how
large a claim must be before it becomes economically feasible for a litigant
to hire a lawyer and bring suit in civil court. 40 It has been suggested that a
limit between $500 and $1,000 would make redress possible for most con-
sumer disputes.41 The limit should not be set higher because of the pressure
from litigants for greater formality in the proceedings where the amount in
controversy is greater. The jurisdictional limit should be periodically re-
examined so that the effective jurisdiction of the court can keep pace with
price level fluctuations.
42
2. Types of Controversies and Remedies Available-Most states limit
small claims court remedies to the recovery of money43 on the ground
that equitable remedies should not be granted after informal, speedy hear-
ings. 44 Under such limitations, a small claims court will not grant equitable
relief to a plaintiff who has an equitable action within its jurisdictional
limit.45 This limitation of remedies is inappropriate in light of studies
showing that repairs, rescission, replacement, and reformation are often
sought in consumer disputes. 46 Since one important function of small
39 See note 145 and accompanying text infra.
40 REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 18. Delays also inhibit
the bringing of a suit in civil court.
41 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 42. The proposed Consumer Contro-
versies Resolution Act provides that small claims courts should set the jurisdictional
limit high enough to permit most consumer controversies to be heard. S. 2069, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)(2) (1975). The proposed parameters should meet this goal.
42 Note, Small Claims in Indiana, 3 IND. L.F. 517, 529 (1970). Setting the
monetary limit on an automatic sliding scale geared to economic indicators would
negate the need for constantly changing the statute or court rule. NICJ STAFF
STUDIES, supra note 4, at 42. The difficulty of using such a procedure lies not in
finding appropriate economic indicators but in writing a reasonably understandable
statute to change periodically the jurisdictional limit with price level fluctuations.
4 3 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-27 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 73.010
(1973); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1801 (1963); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
12.40.010 (Supp. 1974).
44 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 34.
45 In Menkis v. Whitestone Savings & Loan Ass'n, 17 Misc. 2d 329, 356 N.Y.S.2d
485 (Dist. Ct. 1974), a mortgagor was denied reformative relief in seeking to collect
interest on funds held in escrow in connection with a mortgage because the court
found the action to be one in equity not cognizable within the jurisdiction.
46 A detailed study of one consumer fraud bureau of the Illinois Attorney Gen-
eral's Division of Consumer Fraud and Protection showed that 50 percent of the
complainants wanted restitution in the form of partial refund, repair, or replace-
ment; 23 percent wanted the transaction performed or completed; 14 percent wanted
the transaction canceled and their money returned. Steele, Fraud, Dispute and the
Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1138
(1975). A study of consumer cases in the small claims division of the Philadelphia
Municipal Court showed that 22 percent of the complainants wanted home improve-
ments and repairs; 13 percent complained of unsatisfactory products; 8 percent
complained of faulty car repairs; and 5 percent sought appliance repairs and service.
Steadman & Rosenstein, "Small Claims" Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1327 (1973).
[VOL. 9:590
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claims courts is to settle consumer disputes, these courts should be equipped
to give the kinds of remedies consumers demand.
While small claims courts must have the authority to order some equita-
ble remedies if they are to constitute effective forums, they should be pre-
cluded from issuing injunctions and temporary restraining orders. 47 These
remedies may affect broad practices extending far beyond the specific
controversy at issue. Because of the potentially far-reaching impact of
injunctions and temporary restraining orders, these remedies should be
granted only after formal procedures not available in small claims courts.
48
Small claims court jurisdiction should extend to all contract and tort
claims below the monetary ceiling. 49 Most states exclude libel and slander
actions from small claims jurisdiction because legislators have concluded
that these actions are too difficult to be handled by small claims courts. 50
However, libel and slander actions are inherently no more complex than
other tort and contract cases which may arise, and small claims jurisdiction
should include them.
51
Since most consumer disputes can be classified as small claims, consumer
dispute resolution, in particular, is one of the most important functions of
small claims courts. 52 Although studies show that consumers bring only a
47 Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-11.6-4-4 (Burns Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
16-5-1(1) (1953).
48 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 36.
49 Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-11.6-4-2 (Burns Supp. 1975).
5 oSee, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 21 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.8424 (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5531 (1952). Libel and
slander jurisdictional limitations may be attributed to a policy against encouragement
of defamation suits or to the difficulty of proof involved in the actions. Comment,
Small Clamns Courts, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 932, 934 n.15 (1934).
51 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 33.
52 One writer has observed:
At a time when there is increased attention focused on the problems
of consumers, tenants, and the urban poor, the role of the small claims
court should receive increased importance. If molded to meet these
needs of the community, this court can serve as a freely accessible
institution for the rational settlement of disputes.
Note, The Ohio Small Claims Court: An Empirical Study, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 469,
470 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ohio Small Claims].
At the mid-year meeting of the ABA in Philadelphia in 1976, Justin Stanley, the
president-elect of the ABA, stated that he would work towards developing small
claims courts as forums for the resolution of consumer disputes and that an ABA
committee was being formed to develop plans for the idea. Chicago Tribune, Feb.
17, 1976, at 6, col. 3 (Midwest Ed.).
Consumer Reports magazine and the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York have called for the development of small claims courts designed solely to
handle consumer disputes. Buyer v. Seller in Small Claims Court, supra note 13, at
628; NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 28-29. These proposals are based on the
assumption that if the courts do not become known as consumer courts, consumers
will never use them. Id. at 29.
However, imposing such a limitation on small claims courts would create a sig-
nificant practical problem of what to do with the other cases now heard in small
claims court as well as a jurisdictional problem of determining what truly is a con-
sumer case. REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 16.
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small number of the cases heard in small claims courts,5 3 infrequent con-
sumer use of the courts reflects a lack of consumer knowledge about small
claims proceedings rather than their unsuitability as forums for resolution
of consumer grievances.
54
3. Concurrent Jurisdiction with Civil Courts-Most statutes governing
small claims courts provide for concurrent jurisdiction with the regular
civil court.55 Such provisions are desirable since, if small claims courts
were exclusive forums for claims under the jurisdictional limit, litigants
would be less tolerant of the informal and experimental nature of small
claims procedures. 56
B. Claimants
The relative ease and efficiency of obtaining a judgment in small claims
court has led commercial interests to use these courts extensively for debt
collection.57 Commentators have concluded that, in the absence of re-
strictions, commercial interests will continue to be heavy users of small
claims courts.58 Although most states impose no limitations on suits by
commercial parties in small claims courts, 59 a few legislatures have barred
or curtailed the activities of this class of parties by statute.60 These states
53 All NICJ studies showed that the number of consumer cases is small taken
either as an absolute figure or as a proportion of the total cases brought in small
claims courts. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 29. In a study of the Roxbury,
Massachusetts small claims court, 173 consumer actions were brought out of a total
of 1,431 small claims actions in the period from July 1, 1970 to December 23, 1971.
Id., App. A, at 375-76. In a study of the Philadelphia Municipal Court during four
months in 1971, 614 cases were brought by consumers. This represented only a small
fraction of the court's workload. Id., App. C, at 469. In a study of the Los Angeles
small claims court, consumer cases represented 14.1 percent of the 4,435 cases
brought in the 2 1/2 months studied. Id., App. E, at 610 n.1 and accompanying text.
54 Haemmel, supra note 5, at 508.
55 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2702 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 491.08
(1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.02 (Supp. 1975). Some states give small claims
courts exclusive jurisdiction within the court's jurisdictional limit. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-15 (Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 631.1 (Supp. 1975) (concur-
rent only in actions for forcible entry and detainer); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-522(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 299.01 (Supp. 1975) (subject to venue and
summons provisions).
56 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 44.
57 Haemmel, supra note 5, at 507; Note Small Claims Courts as Collection Agen-
cies, 4 STAN. L. REV. 237 (1952).
58 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 48; Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited,
supra note 19, at 61.
59 See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 631.14 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-523(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1974). Most small claims statutes say nothing about who may sue.
60 The New York statute bars corporations, partnerships, and associations from
use of small claims courts. N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1809 (Supp. 1975) (ex-
ception for municipal corporations, public benefit corporations, and school districts
wholly or partially within a municipal corporation). Some statutes bar assignees.
See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117f (Deering Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 1-2307
(Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-08.1-01 (Supp. 1975). Collection agencies are
excluded in some states. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.8408 (Supp. 1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1751 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-39-7
(1967). The Texas statute bars businesses lending money at interest. TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2460a(2) (1971).
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have barred commercial parties in response to their use of "sewer serv-
ice," the practice by some commercial creditors whereby a process server
swears that service has been performed when it has not,61 and in re-
sponse to creditor dominance in courts originally designed for use by in-
dividual litigants.6 2 Frequent resort by commercial creditors to small claims
procedures has been further criticized because these parties develop an ex-
pertise and familiarity with the proceedings, thereby obtaining an unfair
advantage over individual litigants.
6 '
While exclusion of commercial creditors from small claims court may
discourage some questionable credit transactions, 64 it seems likely that
such a restriction would only deflect the collection process to other civil
courts. 65 In addition, the greater delay and inconvenience of the civil
courts could lead businesses to resort to heavyhanded collection practices
instead of using the courts for enforcement purposes. 66 Furthermore, if busi-
nesses were forced to bring all suits in civil courts, the consumer defendant
would be exposed to more formal, complex, and expensive proceedings.6 7
It is unfair to exclude an entire class of parties from a useful adjudication
process because a few have abused the process.68 The better approach is
61 See note 125 and accompanying text infra.
62 Ohio Small Claims, supra note 52, at 469-70.
63 See notes 92-93 and accompanying text infra.
64 The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Incomne Litigant, supra note 4, at
1674.
65 Buyer v. Seller in Small Claims Court, supra note 13, at 628. See also D. CAP-
LOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE-A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT (1974). In
Matter of Vigilante Protective Systems, 333 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), an in-
junction was sought to bar the vacation of thousands of default judgments obtained
by one company on contracts allegedly obtained by fraud. Most of the judgments
had been obtained in the regular civil court, since New York City bars corporations
from using its small claims courts.
66 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 50; The Persecution and Intimidation of
the Low-Income Litigant, supra note 4, at 1674-75.
67 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 51. In Hearings on S. 2928, supra note 4,
at 88-89, Senator Tunney noted that prohibiting corporations from appearing in small
claims courts as plaintiffs merely means that small claims cases end up in the next
highest court, where it is even harder for the consumer to get formal legal represen-
tation and adequate redress.
The inability of businesses to use small claims court procedure may also increase
the cost of credit. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 50. David Van Knapp,
counsel for the District of Columbia Project on Consumer Legal Assistance, in
Hearings on S. 2928, supra note 4, at 87, suggests that the credit structure of New
York City businesses should be examined to determine the effect of disallowing ap-
pearances by corporations in the small claims court.
68 Small Claims in Indiana, supra note 42, at 535. This recommendation not to
exclude suits by commercial parties in small claims courts is consistent with most
state statutes (see note 59 and accompanying text supra), and with the position of
the board of directors of the National Institute of Consumer Justice (REDRESS OF
CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 15-16). The imposition of no limitations
on use by commercial parties is contrary to the limitations placed on commercial
parties by several state statutes (see note 60 and accompanying text supra), and the
denial of the small claims forum for use by corporate plaintiffs sought by a minority
of the board of directors of the National Institute of Consumer Justice (REDRESS
OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 52-54 (separate statement of Blair
Shick and William Clendenen)).
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to let commercial parties use the courts subject to rules for venue 9 and
mass filing which will curb their domination of the courts.70 Although most
small claims courts have no limitation on mass filings, 7' a restriction on
the number of claims that may be filed, like Ohio's statutory provision al-
lowing a party to file no more than six claims within any month, 72 may
be desirable. A limitation on mass filing could also prevent a commercial
party from developing an expertise in small claims procedures that could
place an individual defendant, facing an experienced party, at an undue
disadvantage. 73 Such a limitation would not mean that small claims courts
will look unfavorably on commercial parties, resulting in their complete
abandonment of use of the small claims procedure. Ohio's restriction has
not led sellers to abandon the small claims courts.74 As a further safe-
guard, commentators suggest that claimants who abuse the courts' pro-
cedures should be excluded from them.75 Under such a rule, the judge
would determine the existence of abuse, which could be defined to include
the obtaining of default judgments based on fraudulent or unfair trade
practices, circumventing court rules, or filing colorless claims. 70
The use of small claims courts by creditors does not prevent individual
litigants from using these courts as effectively as creditors now do. The
results of studies showing that plaintiffs overwhelmingly win their cases in
69 See notes 117-23 and accompanying text infra.
70 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 54.
71 The states that have a limit on mass filing are Kansas, Nebraska, and Ohio.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2704 (Supp. 1975) (no more than five claims in any one
calendar year); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-523(6) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (no more than ten
claims in any calendar year); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.08 (Supp. 1975) (no more
than six claims per thirty day period).
72 OIiio REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.08 (Supp. 1975). The board of directors of the
National Institute of Consumer Justice suggests that courts may want to establish
mass filing limits in response to problems that may arise when professional creditors
make heavy use of the courts. REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15,
at 16.
73 See notes 94-95 and accompanying text infra.
74 Ohio Small Claims, supra note 52, at 509. The authors conducted an empirical
study between June 1, 1971 and May 31, 1972 in an urban county, Hamilton (in-
cluding Cincinnati), and a rural county, Clermont (including Batavia). Id. at 477.
The study showed that in Clermont County, 48 percent of the suits were brought by
proprietorships and 41 percent by corporations. In Hamilton County, 36 percent of
the suits were brought by proprietorships and over 37 percent by corporations. Id. at
509. These findings show that businesses and corporations continue to take advantage
of the small claims courts even where restrictions are placed on mass filings.
75 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 55; Small Claiis Courts as Collection
Agencies, supra note 57, at 242.
70 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 55. An example of the abuse of the small
claims process occurred in Menon v. Weil, 66 Misc. 2d 114, 320 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Civ.
Ct. 1971). The United States through the United States Attorney sought dismissal of
twenty small claims actions brought by the estranged wife of a United Nations field
worker stationed in South Korea for support and maintenance against United Nations
officials as agents of her absent husband. The actions were dismissed because of in-
ternationat treaties and the diplomatic immunity of the officials. In accordance with
New York statute (N.Y.C. Clv. CT. ACT § 1810 (1963)) an order was granted re-
straining Mrs. Menon from prosecuting further suits against United Nations officials
in the small claims court.
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small claims courts imply that it is more appropriate to view the small
claims courts as plaintiffs' courts presently dominated by creditor-plaintiffs
than as collection agencies for creditors.7 7 Such a distinction suggests that
use of small claims courts by creditors does not preclude individuals from
utilizing these courts nor does it justify excluding creditors from using
small claims procedures. 78 Instead, access to the small claims court should
be available to any individual or organization.
C. Court Use and Court Hours
Studies indicate that the infrequent use of small claims courts by non-
commercial plaintiffs results in part from a lack of knowledge of the
courts' existence or of how it functions.79 When small claims courts are
publicized, individual plaintiffs sue more frequently. 80 Public relations ef-
forts81 and small claims court handbooks for the public 82 will increase the
courts' visibility and use.
The location of small claims courts in downtown areas may restrict
some potential plaintiffs' use of the courts. Neighborhood small claims
courts have been suggested for the sake of convenience and have been
implemented on an experimental basis in New York City.83 While lack of
experience with neighborhood forums precludes any conclusion as to their
effectiveness, 84 further experimentation seems desirable.
Those who use the courts frequently complain that the hours during
which the courts are open for filing and trial are short and inconvenient. 85
Since so many users complain about inconvenient hours, it seems likely
77 In a study of the Oakland, Piedmont, and Emeryville, California small claims
courts, plaintiffs were found to receive judgment in 90 percent of the claims decided.
California Small Claims, supra note 2, at 886. In a study of the Los Angeles small
claims court, plaintiffs were found to receive judgment in 85.7 percent of the claims
heard. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, App. E, at 587.
78 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 11.
79 Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 321; Haemmel, supra note 5, at 503.
80 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 258-59. When a radio station in Columbus,
Ohio started making announcements about the small claims court in 1971, the case-
load of the Columbus court increased significantly. Small claims courts in Boston
ahd Detroit had similar success when the court was publicized by radio and news-
paper. Id.
81 S. 2069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a)(2) (1975); REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEV-
ANCES, supra note 15, at 24; Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 321.
82 Every jurisdiction with a small claims court should' make a guide to small claims
courts available to the public. The guide should include copies of all necessary
forms. For an example of Such a guide, see J. BADNER, THE NEW YORK HANDBOOK
ON SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO FIGHTING YOUR CASE (1975).
83 The Harlem small claims court is a community court. NICJ STAFF STUDIES,
supra note 4, App. H, at 690. The NICJ Staff Study recommends local small claims
courts that would be part of the regular court system. Id. at 25. Neighborhood small
claims courts could be particularly appropriate in urban areas. REDRESS OF CONSUMER
GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 18.
84 See the extensive discussion in NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 21-28.
85 S. REP. No. 1164, supra note 15, at 11; NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at
62-63; Ohio Small Claims, supra note 52, at 489-90.
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that limited hours deter potential plaintiffs from using small claims courts.8 6
Although limited court hours also deter the use of other civil courts, the
problem is more significant with respect to small claims courts, since the
low monetary value of the claims makes potential plaintiffs less willing to
take time off from work and to lose pay, to present their claims. This prob-
lem could be solved by scheduling some small claims court sessions during
non-working hours. Evening sessions, like those presently held in New
York City, and additional court hours on Saturdays, would make the courts
more accessible.8 7 As small claims courts become better known and more




1. Attorney Representation-Most small claims courts allow attorneys
to appear in the proceedings.8 9 However, it has been suggested that the
litigant represented by an attorney has an unfair advantage over the pro se
litigant.90 The presence of attorneys complicates the proceedings to the prac-
tical and psychological detriment of the individual litigant. Also, the presence
of attorneys has been found to undermine the small claims court ideal
of speedy, inexpensive, informal, and understandable proceedings. 91
Some states, motivated by these factors and by concern over pos-
sible inequities when a commercial litigant represented by an attorney
sues an individual litigant appearing pro se, have barred attorneys
86 See The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant, supra note 4,
at 1671, where it is stated:
If court sessions were made convenient for the working man, defaults
might decrease significantly, witnesses would be more available, and
the pressures that stem from squeezing the small claims calendar into
a crowded court docket might be alleviated.
See also Steadman & Rosenstein, supra note 46, at 1337.
87 S. 2069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(b)(3) (1975); REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEV-
ANCES, supra note 15, at 18. The District of Columbia Code has a requirement that
the small claims court operate on Saturdays and on one evening a week (D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-1302 (1973)), but this is not done in practice. Murphy, D.C. Small Claims
-The Forgotten Court, 34 D.C.B.J. 14, 20 (Feb. 1967).
88 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 66.
89 See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 631.14 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. JTAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 7452 (1964); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a(2) (1971).
S90 A study of small claims cases in which parties appearing pro se were opposed
by attorneys revealed:
When an attorney opposes a litigant acting on his own behalf, the
interaction is again affected by the deference that the lawyer's profes-
sional status commands. The lay litigant may feel constrained from
challenging or strongly opposing the lawyer or even from presenting
his own view of the case. If he feels ill-at-ease in the courtroom, the
sensation may be increased by the contrast between his own demeanor
and that of the lawyer, who is accustomed to appearing in court, adept
at argumentation, and perhaps, on familiar terms with the judge.
NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, App. A, at 404. Banning attorneys from small
claims courts would prevent this situation from arising.
91 id. at 215, 218. Attorneys interject legal technicalities and formality into the
trial, defeating any hope for a simple procedure where grievances can be informally
resolved. See also R. SMITH, supra note 8, at 53.
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from the small claims courts altogether.92 Since the cost of hiring an
attorney and the necessity of counsel for successful litigation are
major deterrents to access to the courts, 93 prohibiting attorneys is a de-
sirable way to encourage use of small claims courts by those lacking the
means to employ attorneys for small claims,9 4 and to hold down the cost
of resolving minor disputes.
Even without attorney representation, agents of business plaintiffs which
frequently resort to small claims courts are likely to become familiar with
the procedures of the court and the law relevant to the types of cases that
the agents handle.9 5 These agents gain familiarity and credibility with the
court and obtain a distinct advantage over individual defendants. 96 The
use of paraprofessionals to assist individual litigants may counter the
strength of business litigants.9 7
Although disallowing attorneys altogether in small claims court pro-
ceedings may create constitutional due process problems,9 8 the right to
an appeal with a trial de novo in the ordinary civil court satisfies the due
process right to be heard by counsel and the constitutional right to a jury
trial. This principle was established in Capital Traction Co. v. Hoff,99
where the Supreme Court held that a trial by a judge in the justice of the
peace court with trial by jury only on appeal satisfied the seventh amend-
92 Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 19, at 65. The author of the
above-cited comment suggests having the state provide counsel for indigents, but the
cost of such representation may be prohibitive. His proposal would not provide
counsel to those who could not economically justify hi ring an attorney because of
the small amount involved and the expense of attorneys. See note 22 and accompany-
ing text supra.
93 Willging, supra note 3, at 304. Willging discusses financial barriers to access to
the courts by the poor.
94 Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 295. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § l17g (Deering
Supp. 1976) states "No attorney at law or other person than the plaintiff and defend-
ant should take any part in filing or prosecution or defense of such litigation." See
also the similar provisions of IDAHO CODE § 1-2308 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 61-2707(a) (Supp. 1974) (no party represented by an attorney prior to judgment);
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.8408 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 491.02
(1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-523(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The board of directors of
the National Institute of Consumer Justice also recommends that lawyers should
not be allowed to appear except to sue on their own behalf. REDRESS OF CONSUMER
GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 23. There was a dissenting view to this recommenda-
tion. Id. at 48 (separate statement of Philip Elman). Attorneys may continue to give
advice to parties appearing in the small claims court, but they may not represent the
parties in the small claims forum.
95 The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant, supra note 4, at
1662.
96 Id. at 1663; Comment, The Nature and Operation of the New York Small Claims
Court, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 196, 204 (1974) [hereinafter cited as New York Small
Claims Court].
97 See notes 102-05 and accompanying text infra.
98 The Supreme Court has held:
if in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily
to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a
denial of... hearing, and therefore, . . . due process in the constiutional
sense.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
99 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
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ment jury trial guarantee. Similarly, the right to a jury trial and the right
be be represented by counsel must be available on appeal from a small
claims court judgment.
The California statutory provision barring attorneys from appearing in
small claims courts was challenged on due process grounds in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Small Claims Court.100 Following Hoff, the court held
that due process is not denied "as long as the right to appear by counsel
is guaranteed in a real sense somewhere in the proceedings.' u 0 Since
California's statute allowed the defendant a new trial on appeal with repre-
sentation by counsel, due process requirements were found to be satisfied.
To protect pro se litigants from the complications of confrontation with
an attorney, and to preserve the informality and speed of the small claims
proceedings, attorneys should be disallowed from appearing in small claims
courts. Such a limitation will be free from constitutional defects if pro-
vision is made for representation by counsel on appeal in a trial de novo.
2. Clerks and Legal Paraprofessionals-If attorneys are barred from
small claims courts, litigants may need assistance in preparing their claims
and defenses. It has been suggested that clerks and legal paraprofessionals
be made available to assist the parties and to familiarize them with court
proceedings. 10 2
Clerks should give the parties technical and clerical assistance in such
matters as scheduling the trial and mailing out the summons. They should
also provide information, answering questions about the court and referring
the parties to legal paraprofessionals for any necessary assistance in pre-
paring their cases. Since clerks are not trained to give advice regarding
legal questions, legal paraprofessionals rather than clerks should guide
parties in their preparation for litigation. 10 3 In the Harlem small claims
court, paralegals help litigants prepare cases, tell them what to bring to
trial, answer questions about the court, and sit in on proceedings to offer
support to fearful and shy litigants. 0 4 While unauthorized practice restric-
tions prevent paraprofessionals from representing litigants in the proceed-
ings, paralegals serve a valuable function in preparing and supporting
parties presenting or defending small claims.'0 5 They may also help to
10076 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d 38 (1946).
101 Id. at 382, 173 P.2d at 40.
102 Pound, supra note 1, at 319; Steadman & Rosenstein, supra note 46, at 1318.
Some statutes specifically provide that the clerk should assist individuals, upon re-
quest, in filling out their claims. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117c (Deering
Supp. 1976); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.8403 (Supp. 1975). Both the proposed
Consumer Controversies Resolution Act (S. 2069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(b)(2)
(1975)) and the report of the board of directors of the National Institute of Con-
sumer Justice (REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 19) recom-
mended that court personnel should assist parties in the small claims court.
103 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 235.
14 Id., App. H, at 692.
105 Id. at 244. For a discussion of the role of legal paraprofessionals see gen-
erally Comment, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice, 8 HARV. CIV.
R1GHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 104 (1973); Brickman, Expansion of the Lawyering Pro-
cess Through a New Delivery System: The Emergence and State of Legal Parapro-
fessionalism, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1153 (1971).
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counter the strength of business litigants who send experienced agents to
small claims courts, thereby increasing chances for fair determination of
claims.
3. Judges-In the interest of speed, economy, and informality,
most small claims court legislation disallows trial by jury. 10 6 Rather, trial
is by the court, leaving the judge with liberal powers to conduct the hearing
and render judgment. l07 The informality of the process and the absence
of professional advocates to assist in developing the case further increase
judicial discretion.108
Where there are no attorneys to present and focus facts and issues, the
judge must play an active role in the proceedings. 109 He must expedite the
hearing and bring out the essential evidence upon which a decision can be
reached. 110 By so acting, he can guard against abuses and preserve a fair
trial for both parties.11 ' However, an inherent problem with the judge
assuming such an active role is the possible compromise of the judge's
impartiality.
1 12
Because of the nature of the proceedings and the discretion given to the
court, small claims courts cannot operate effectively without extremely
capable judges.1' 3 Small claims court judges often serve as part of a rota-
tion through the court system." 4 Although the rotation process assures
that small claims judges will be legally trained, the danger exists that small
claims judges will fail to take their role seriously. 115 Screening of judges
would help to ensure that only those judges sincerely interested in working
in small claims courts serve there. The difficult function, that the small
claims judge has to perform, calls for a sympathetic and serious judge.11 6
106 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-525 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-08.1-03 (Supp. 1975). The claimant is said to waive any right to a jury by
bringing the claim in small claims court. See note 177 and accompanying text inira.
Defendants seeking a jury trial are often given a right of removal to the regular
civil court. See note 143 and accompanying text infra.
107 Some statutes have specifically invested wide discretionary powers in the judge.
See, e.g., S.D.'COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-39-35 (1967) (duty of the judge to conduct
hearings so as to discover facts and to determine the justice of cases); TEX REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 2460a(9) (1971) (duty of the judge to develop all facts and to exer-
cise discretion so as to effectuate a correct judgment and to speedily dispose of cases).
108 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 219.
109 New York Small Claims Court, supra note 96, at 212.
110 Adams, supra note 24, at 607.
111 The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-income Litigant, supra note 4,
at 1665.
112 Adams, supra note 24, at 602-03, 608.
113 R. SMITH, supra note 8, at 47-48.
114 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.8401 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:6-42 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 46.415 (1975). In New Mexico and In-
diana 'udges are elected to serve solely as small claims judges. IND. ANN. STAT. §
33-11.6-3-2 (Burns Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 16-5-3 (1953).
115 Some civil court judges view small claims duty as K.P. duty. These judges
dislike presiding over cases involving legally untrained pro se litigants and sums they
regard as trivial. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 222.
116 Id. at 225.
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E. Pretrial Procedures
1. Venue-Although the problem of proper venue rarely arises in
small claims tort actions, since venue is in the county where the injury
took place or where the defendant resides, the problem may be complex in
contract actions, especially when mail-order and door-to-door sales com-
panies are involved. 117 One empirical study in California determined that
20 percent of all claims brought were against out-of-county defendants,
and 50 percent of the claims brought by corporations were against out-
of-county defendants."
Despite the widespread existence of this problem, small claims courts
rarely grant transfer of venue. 119 Enactment of statutory provisions per-
mitting discretionary transfer of cases to a more convenient forum may
alleviate this problem.'2 0 Venue requirements should be flexible, 121 but
guidelines are needed for determining venue when the action is filed. Venue
should lie where the action arises or where the defendant resides or does
business -.12 2 Actions brought in the wrong venue may be dismissed unless




2. Pleadings-Since a statement of the claim may be difficult for lay
parties to draft and to understand, most small claims courts require no
formal pleading except for a simplified statement of claim and n6tice.
124
Notice requirements should be limited to informing the defendant of the
nature of the dispute, the amount of money involved, and the hearing
date.-
25
3. Service of Process-Small claims courts have been plagued with high
default judgment rates. Studies suggest that one reason for this problem is the
117 Id. at 74; Small Claims in Indiana, supra note 42, at 531.
118 California Small Clains, supra note 2, at 887.
119 This was the finding of studies based on the Oakland, Piedmont, and Emery-
ville, California small claims courts. Discretionary change of venue is rarely granted,
unless an express statutory provision provides for it. Id. at 879 n.35.
1201d. at 889; Comment, Small Claims Courts and the Poor, 42 S. CAL. L. REV.
493, 500 (1969).
121 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 83. Although flexibility of approach
provides no ready answer to a particular venue question, it is recognized that the
test for venue varies depending upon the particular circumstances. The need for
flexibility in venue is stated well by Carrington & Martin, Substantive Inierests and
the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 230 (1967):
It is the thesis of this article that the requisite minimum quantum of
"contact" between the defendant and the forum does and should vary
with the measure of the values affected and the costs inflicted by the
attempted exercise of power. In other words, the test, however phrased,
must be adapted to the needs of each of the environments in which it
must operate.
122 Cf. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.8415 (Supp. 1975).
123 Cf. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 299.11(5) (Supp. 1975).
124 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1171 (Deering Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. l10A, § 282 (1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-8 (Supp. 1975).
125 Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 19, at 50. For examples of
simplified notice appropriate for use in small claims court, see CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 117h (Deering Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 282 (1968).
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failure of defendants to receive notice.':- In New York City, personal ser-
vice has often resulted in "sewer service.' 2 7 Most states follow the more
effective and less expensive procedure of service by registered or certified
mail requiring the defendant's signature on the return receipt to validate
service. 128 These states allow personal service if service cannot be effected
by mail, or if personal service would be more effective under the circum-
stances.
1 29
4. Fees-Fees are levied on filing, service of process, and use of col-
lection remedies by most small claims courts.130 Minimal costs will ensure
that the court will be accessible to all who desire to use it, and costs should
be waivable for indigents.
13 '
5. Arbitration and Conciliation Alternatives-Resort to small claims
court usually takes place only after informal attempts at settlement have
failed.1: 3 For this reason, some cases may be more amenable to settlement
by mediation than by adjudication." 3 3 Since a trial often leaves one or both
of the parties dissatisfied with the legal process, an agreement worked out
through arbitration may have a positive psychological effect on the parties
involved." 4 Although the informal proceedings of small claims courts blur
126 In Chicago, 29 percent of the debtors in default said that they had not been
served. In New York City, the figure was 46 percent. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 65,
at 194. The actual percentage of defendants not receiving notice is probably lower
than that found by Caplovitz since he obtained his data directly from the defendants
without checking with court records to determine whether the notice had been re-
ceived and signed by the defendant. Nevertheless, the percentage of defendants
claiming not to have received notice probably is a good indication that a substantial
number of defendants do not actually receive notice.
127 Small Claims Court: Reform Revisited, supra note 19, at 53. See Comment,
Abuse of Process: Sewer Service, 3 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 17 (1967) for a de-
tailed examination of the practice of "sewer service."
128 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117c (Deering Supp. 1976); N.Y. UNIFORM
DIST. CT. ACT § 1803 (1963); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 12.40.40 "(1974). The de-
fendant's own signature should be required to validate service. If delivery and signa-
ture by someone at the defendant's residence would be enough for valid service, the
defendant would often fail to receive personal notice. Hearings on S. 2928, supra note
4, at 86 (statement of Marianne Freeman, Consumer Action Director, Washington,
D.C., Urban League).
129 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503:6 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1755 (Supp. 1975).
130 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1 17p (Deering Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.8420 (Supp. 1975). Fees range from $0 to $15. Buyer v. Seller in
Small Claims Court, supra note 13, at 629-31.
131 Massachusetts and the District of Columbia are the only jurisdictions having
statutes allowing waiver of fees. Massachusetts small claims court rules may be
written to provide for elimination of all fees and costs. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
218, § 22 (1974). The District of Columbia Code provides that the judge may waive
prepayment or payment upon the plaintiff's sworn statement or evidence of the
inability to pay costs. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3903 (1973). The board of directors of
the National Institute of Consumer Justice also recommends that the court have
discretion to waive fees.
132 Steadman & Rosenstein, supra note 46, at 1331.
133 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 248.
134 Small Claims in Indiana, supra note 42, at 532.
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the distinction between traditional adjudication and arbitration, 135 the
trial retains some measure of formality that distinguishes it from arbitration.
While further data are needed to determine the effectiveness of arbitration
and conciliation in small claims proceedings, small claims courts should
experiment with these methods of settling controversies.
Conciliation, a binding procedure whereby a decision is reached only
upon the mutual consent of the parties, has been used as a voluntary pre-
trial procedure. 136 While such a proceeding may expedite resolution of
cases, criticism has been directed at those systems where the judge acts
as conciliator and hears the trial if the parties cannot be reconciled. 13
If the judge has failed to settle the dispute through conciliation, he may be
prejudiced against one of the parties when the case is brought to trial. 138
To avoid prejudice, no judge should act 'as conciliator and adjudicator
in the same case. Potential problems could be avoided by appointing law-
yers to serve as mediators.
139
Arbitration, a process whereby a binding decision is made by a third
party outside of the courtroom, should be made available not as a pre-
trial procedure but as an alternative to the trial. Arbitration by volunteer
lawyers has been successfully used in New York City small claims
courts. 140 There, parties are informed when they appear for trial that they
may have their dispute arbitrated with less formality but that they thereby
waive the right to appeal.' 4 ' Those who prefer may choose to appear be-
fore a judge.
While the use of conciliation and arbitration in small claims courts has
been limited, these mechanisms may effectively supplement trial proce-
dures for parties for whom a mutually satisfactory agreement can be
worked out. For those disputants who cannot be reconciled, trial before
135 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 114.
136 The District of Columbia small claims statute provides that with the consent
of the parties, settlement may be reached through the methods of conciliation and
arbitration. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1322 (1973). In Minnesota, the small claims court
is titled a conciliation court where the judge is urged to use his best endeavors to
have the parties settle their controversy by mutual agreement. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 491.03(2) (1971). In Ohio, a court may, by rule, establish a voluntary conciliation
procedure. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.02 (1973). In the Virgin Islands, the
judge is urged to conciliate the parties prior to trial. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, App. IV,
Rule 64 (1968).
137 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 160.
138 Adams, supra note 24, at 598. The conciliator inevitably becomes coercive in
trying to settle a claim. If unsuccessful, the conciliator is liable to resent the party
who has turned down his settlement suggestion. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4,
at 160.
139 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 161; REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES,
supra note 15, at 21.
140 See the discussion of arbitration in New York City in NICJ STAFF STUDIES,
supra note 4, App. H (Small Claims Procedure in New York City: The Arbitration
Model),.at 687-90. Arbitrators in the New York City small claims court are lawyers
selected by the administrative judge from a list of names submitted by the New
York State and New York City bar associations. The arbitrators sit about once per
month and are not compensated for their services. There are more than enough
applicants to fill the positions.
141 Id. at 693.
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a judge rather than negotiated settlement will be necessary.
6. Removal-Many states allow removal of cases from the small claims
court by the defendant if a counterclaim is asserted which exceeds the
jurisdictional limit, 142 or if the defendant seeks a jury trial. 143 Defendants
often use the removal option to stifle the prosecution of cases by plaintiffs
who cannot afford to pursue the more expensive and inconvenient civil
court trials.144 This problem can be effectively solved by limiting removal
to cases in which the defendant shows, or the court on its own motion
finds, that good reasons for removal, such as complex points of law or
multiple parties, are present.
145
Any infirmities which disallowing removal would present with respect
to compulsory counterclaims could be solved by permitting counterclaims
only within the jurisdictional limits, reserving the defendant's right to bring
a counterclaim above the limit in the regular civil court.146 In cases not
involving counterclaims, constitutional problems could be sidestepped by
allowing the defendant a jury trial on appeal in a trial de novo if dissatis-
fied with the small claims court decision.
14 r
F. Trial Procedures
1. Conduct of the Hearing-Small claims court advocates stress the
need for informality and freedom from technicalities to ensure efficient
and understandable proceedings. 148 Many small claims statutes provide
that the formal rules of evidence do not apply.149 Such provisions are
142 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117r (Deering 1972); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT.
ACT § 1805(b) (1963); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1925.10 (1973).
143 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-31 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 46.465(3)
(1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-39-17 (1967).
144 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 121.
145 Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.040 (1975); REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES,
supra note 15, at 17.
146 Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-2706 (Supp. 1974); NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra
note 4, at 99.
147 See notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
218, § 23 (Supp. 1975) provides:
Every cause begun under the procedure shall be determined initially in
district court. No such cause may be removed for trial in the superior
court.
The court may in its discretion transfer the cause. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218,
§ 25 (1974). See also NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 122.
148 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 123; Adams, supra note 24, at 615.
149 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-32 (Supp. 1974); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.8411 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNIFORM DIST. CT. ACT § 1804 (Supp. 1975) (with
additional exceptions of communication with decedents and lunatics). An evidentiary
exception is generally made for privileged communications. In states where the small
claims court act says nothing about modification of the rules of evidence, courts
have held that the rules of evidence apply in small claims court. See, e.g., Smith v.
Champaign-Urbana City Lines, Inc., 116 Ill. App. 2d 289, 252 N.E.2d 381 (1969).
This approach does not comport with the idea of a forum designed to be accessible
to individual litigants and should not be followed.
The hearing should be informal. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7452
(1964); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a(7) (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-567
(Cum. Supp. 1975). The judge should admit evidence that he deems material and
proper. Cf. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503:7 (1968).
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necessary if litigants are to be able to present their cases effectively pro
se.15 0 While evidentiary rules serve a legitimate function in more formal
proceedings heard by juries, these technicalities need not be rigorously ob-
served in a case heard by a judge whose function is to examine the parties
and receive material evidence. 51
2. Substantive Law--Statutes and court rules uniformly require that
small claims judges follow state substantive law in reaching their de-
cisions.152 As a practical matter, the short, speedy, and informal small
claims court trial, conducted without the benefit of counsel to sharpen
the legal issues, has necessarily resulted in a system where judges take a
common sense approach without strict adherence to the substantive
law. 153 Two safeguards exist to protect litigants from potential abuses
arising from this process: cases involving complicated questions of sub-
stantive law may be removed to a plenary court, 5 4 and a de novo
trial on appeal is available after the informal small claims trial.155
3. Continuances-Continuances, while occasionally necessary to allow
a party to prepare adequately for litigation, are sometimes used to defeat
a bona fide claim or defense. A defendant may seek a continuance to
force the plantiff to drop his claim; 15 6 a plaintiff may seek a continuance
in the hope that the defendant will fail to appear a second time and will
150 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 132.
151 In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a judge to commit
reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not.
Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950). Similarly,
a small claims judge, acting without a jury, can decide cases without following the
technicalities of the rules of evidence.
152 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.8411 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNIFORM
DIST. CT. ACT § 1804 (Supp. 1975). Most small claims court statutes make no refer-
ence to substantive law being followed since it is assumed that as a court of law small
claims courts are bound to do so. Those statutes which refer explicitly to substantive
law state that substantial justice should be done according to the rules of substantive
law.
153 In Bierman v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 497, 302 N.Y.S.2d 696 (Civ.
Ct. 1969), a small claims judge held the City of New York and Consolidated Edison
liable to an elderly woman whose basement was damaged by a ruptured water main
in front of her house. His statement of the case illustrates the common sense ap-
proach of a small claims judge:
The rule of substantive law says that Mrs. Bierman may not recover
because she cannot prove negligence on the part of the city or of Con-
solidated Edison. Is this substantial justice? Only a very backward
lawyer would think so. Why would a lady little able to bear the loss
nevertheless bear it? Because the metropolis and the great utility were
not at fault, we are told. Yet the concept of fault is beside the point.
60 Misc. 2d at 498, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The judge found that there was no negli-
gence and held the defendants liable on a strict liability theory. The appellate term
of the supreme court, in Bierman v. Consolidated Edison Co., 66 Misc. 2d 237, 320
N.Y.S.2d 331 (App. T. 1970), reversed the holding of strict liability and dismissed
the suit against the Consolidated Edison Company. The court affirmed the judgment
on a finding of negligence on the part of New York City, but reprimanded the small'
claims judge, stating that stability and certainty in the law require adherence to
substantive law.
154 See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
155 See notes 176-78 and accompanying text infra.
156 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 145.
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be adjudged in default. 15 Continuances also affect the speedy rendering
of justice. 158 They should be granted only for good reason, as when a liti-
gant has come to court without important evidence or witnesses. 159
4. Default Judgments-While sellers must have ready access to efficient
legal processes for debt collection in a society where credit transactions
are widely used, 160 default judgments do not always occur simply because
the debtor has no defense to the claim against him. 161 In one study of
debtors against whom default judgments had been entered, 35 percent
of the debtors surveyed gave reasons for their default which were a result
of the creditor's actions. 162 Confronted with what they felt to be fraudu-
lent conduct in the transaction from which the debt arose, consumers
refused to pay amounts they thought were not justly due.163 Many small
claims court cases arise in this manner; a high default rate results because
the debtor fails to receive notice0 4 or because he does not know how to
respond. 165 In either case, the consumer is subjected to judgment without
a hearing. 166 Most states grant default automatically if a defendant fails
to appear and the court determines that proper notice has been given.
167
157 Steinberg, The Small Claims Court: A Consumer's Forgotten Forum, 63 NAT'L
Civic R. 289 (1974). The author observed the Washington, D.C. small claims court
and learned the following:
One lawyer admitted, "You ask for a continuance when you have a
weak case and the defendant shows up. He won't be able to afford to
take another day off from work, and you'll win a default judgment
next time."
Id. at 290.
158 Steadman & Rosenstein, supra note 46, at 1328.
15) If possible, the judge should hold the trial without the evidence or testimony,
but in some cases such evidence will be essential, necessitating a continuance. NICJ
STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 146; TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a(8) (1971);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 299.27(2) (Supp. 1975).
160 Comment, Due Process Denied: Consumer Default Judgments in New York
City, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 370 (1974); Comment, Resort to the Legal Pro-
cess in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative
Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 879, 901 (1967).
161 The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant, supra note 4,
at 1664.
162 D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 65, at 91. The book is based on responses to detailed
interviews with 1,331 default-debtors sampled from court records in Chicago, Detroit,
New York City, and Philadelphia.
163 The debtor was almost always able and willing to pay but was withholding
payments. Id. at 125. See also Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 283.
164 See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
165 Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 5, at 284. The debtor's inaction is often due to
a lack of knowledge as to any source of help with consumer difficulties. D. CAPLO-
VITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 175 (1963).
166 It has been suggested that injustice is done by allowing a default judgment
to be entered when a defendant fails to appear if: (1) the defendant was never
served; (2) nonpayment is due to a misunderstanding over the contract; (3) the de-
fendant has a valid defense; (4) the defendant wanted to pay, but needed more time
on an installment payment schedule; (5) the defendant failed to show up in court
for other reasons, such as personal problems; or (6) the defendant is ignorant of
the consequences of default. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 140.
167 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 491.05 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
12.40.060 (1962).
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In many jurisdictions the clerk is authorized to enter the judgment after
proof of service, so that a defendant may be found in default although the
judge has never heard his case.' 68
Small claims court rules should not grant substantive rights in con-
sumer credit transactions by way of procedural "tinkering," 169 but they
can and should provide procedural safeguards to insure that litigants'
substantive rights are protected and a defendant is not adjudged in de-
fault without a chance to assert those rights. To this end, several states
have enacted statutory safeguards against automatic default judgments that
require the plantiff to present some evidence to prove the validity of the
claim before the entry of judgment. 170 At this time, the judge should in-
quire into whether the plaintiff has contacted the defendant and attempted
to settle by informal means.17' If the plaintiff has not done this, default
should not be granted. In New York City, arbitrators determine whether
a defendant should be adjudged in default. 172 In the event that a defendant
fails to receive notice of a small claims court hearing or does not under-
stand the nature of the proceedings being brought against him, a further
procedural safeguard would be to allow a party held in default to reopen
,the judgment against him.173 Enactment of safeguards such as these would
permit the creditor to obtain a default judgment upon a proper showing of
a legitimate claim and also protect the debtor from the overreaching
creditor.
G. Post-Trial Procedures
1. Appeals-Although appeals are rarely taken from small claims court
decisions, 174 the right should be made available to both parties. 7 ; Partic-
168 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3902(f) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 631.5
(Supp. 1975).
169 Adams, supra note 24, at 585.
170CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 117g (Deering Supp. 1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
299.22(2) (Supp. 1975). Although inquiry into every default judgment may take a
considerable amount of time, it may in the long run save time and improve the ad-
ministration of justice because creditors will be less likely to burden the court with
collection cases of questionable merit or with those cases that could be settled out-
side of court. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 141-42. Both the proposed Con-
sumer Controversies Resolution Act (S. 2069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c)(6)
(1975)) and the recommendation of the board of directors of the National Institute
of Consumer Justice (REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 22)
provide that the plaintiff should present some evidence to prove the validity of his
claim before a default judgment will be entered.
171 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 141.
172 Id., App. H, at 686-87.
173Cf. ORE. REV. STAT. § 46.475(5) (1975).
174 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 178.
175 Most jurisdictions give either the defendant or both parties the right to appeal
if dissatisfied with the small claims court judgment. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 177j (Deering Supp. 1976) (only the defendant); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
2460a(12) (1971) (both parties). Hawaii does not provide for an appeal, but the
small claims court may alter or set aside any judgment. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-28
(Supp. 1974). In Michigan, the plaintiff and defendant who try their case in small
claims court waive any right to trial by jury or to an appeal. MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 600.8412 (Supp. 1975). In South Dakota, the plaintiff waives his right to
[VOL. 9:590
Small Claims Courts
ularly in the small claims court, when trial normally is before a judge with-
out a jury and without attorneys, due process requires that an appeal be
available to the defendant."76 The right to a trial de novo on appeal in a
civil court would preserve the informality of a small claims court while
preserving the parties' rights to be represented by counsel and heard by a
jury.
Some state statutes provide that the defendant has the right to appeal
from an adverse judgment, while the plaintiff waives the right to appeal by
submitting his claim to the small claims forum instead of the civil court
with concurrent jurisdiction.' 77 To encourage individual litigants to utilize
the small claims courts and to protect them from possible injustices re-
suIing from informal procedures, plaintiffs as well as defendants should
have the right to appeal.' 78 While the right to appeal must be protected
for constitutional reasons, 179 an appeal may force the adverse party to
abandon his claim.18 0 Non-meritorious appeals would be discouraged, and
the interest in finality would be properly balanced against the right to
appeal if the prevailing party on appeal were allowed to recover costs and
attorney's fees only when the civil court judgment differs significantly from
the small claims court judgment.' 8 '
2. Enforcement of Judgments-Successful small claims court plaintiffs
complain of difficulty in collecting their judgments. 8 2 This problem has
been found to result from the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of how to go
about collecting on a judgment and from the failure of the court to inform
the successful litigant of court procedures available for collecting on a judg-
ment.' 8  In addition, there is no inexpensive or efficient way to collect from
a determined opponent. However, procedural changes can do much to
resolve the problem of collecting on judgments. It has been suggested that
the judge should question the defendant about payment after judgment is
rendered. 84 Some statutes provide that if the judge finds the losing party
unable to pay the judgment in full, provision may be made for payment
by installments. 18 5 Clerks and paraprofessionals may help victorious plain-
appeal by bringing the action in small claims court (S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
15-39-16 (1967)), and the defendant has no right to appeal but can remove the case
to the civil court for a jury trial. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 15-39-17 (1967).
176 See notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra.
177 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-6-10 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
12.40.120 (1962).
178 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 176. Providing an appeal right for both
parties is contrary to the recommendation of the board of directors of the National
Institute of Consumer Justice that only the defendant have the right to appeal.
REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES, supra note 15, at 22.
179 See notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra.
180 The same problem is raised by the removal option. See note 144 and ac-
companying text supra.
181 Small Claims in Indiana, supra note 42, at 534.
182 Steadman & Rosenstein, supra note 46, at 1335-36; Ohio Small Claims, supra
note 52, at 483.
183 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 185.
184 Id. at 186. A party is most amenable to collection when in court.
185 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1IOA, § 288 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A: 18-66 (1952).
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tiffs by assisting in informal collection efforts such as calling the losing
party and informing plaintiffs of the availability of execution if the judg-
ment remains unsatisfied. 186
III. CONCLUSION
Because small claims are regarded as relatively unimportant, neither
states nor local governments have provided sufficient resources for the ef-
fective operation of small claims courts. Remedying the problems of
small claims courts will require allocating funds and other resources. 187
This is especially so in light of the need for continued experimentation
and for development of specialized small claims tribunals to meet the
varying legal needs of urban, suburban, and rural communities. 18
Small claims courts should be established or reformed to incorporate
the changes suggested in this note. The Appendix contains the text of a
Model Small Claims Court Act which includes most of these recommenda-
tions. However, some of the suggested changes do not lend themselves to
statutory form and should be provided for by local court rule. For example,
not every judicial district will have sufficient litigation in the small claims
court to provide for evening and Saturday sessions. Thus, a statute legis-
lating that every judicial district must hold evening and Saturday sessions
would be inappropriate. Most of the suggested changes do lend themselves
to incorporation in the statutory form and have been included in the ap-
pended Model Small Claims Court Act.
Section 1 of the Model Small Claims Court Act provides for the estab-
lishment of small claims courts throughout a state court system with judges
of the civil court serving in the small claims division. Screening of judges
for service in the small claims division should be done informally or by
local court rule. 8 9 Section 2 provides for subject matter jurisdiction ex-
186NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 187; see, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §
I l7ha (Deering 1972) (execution but no attachment or garnishment); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.8410 (Supp. 1975). A small claims court judge should not be able
to jail a debtor for contempt upon the failure to obey an order to pay. NICJ STAFF
STUDIES, supra note 4, at 37.
187 Funding remains a serious impediment to the establishment of effective small
claims courts. NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 266. It has been suggested that
federal funding would stimulate the states and localities to establish small claims
courts where they do not now exist and allow the federal government to set basic
standards for small claims courts. Id. at 267; REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES,
supra note 15, at 25.
The Consumer Controversies Resolution Act, S. 2069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) has been introduced by Senators Moss, Magnuson, and Tunney as a measure
that would provide grants to states and localities in establishing new consumer
redress mechanisms and improving existing mechanisms. A Bureau of Consumer
Redress would be established within the Federal Trade Commission to administer
the program and to articulate and evaluate standards for a model system of con-
sumer controversy resolution. The passage of an act like the proposed Consumer
Controversies Resolution Act could provide the necessary impetus to the develop-
ment of adequate small claims courts.
188 NICJ STAFF STUDIES, supra note 4, at 270; Small Claims in Indiana, supra
note 42, at 528-29.
189 See notes 113-16 and accompanying text supra.
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tending to all civil actions, excluding injunctions, brought by any individual
or organization beneath the jurisdictional limit within the parameters speci-
fied to be determined at the option of a particular jurisdiction. 190 Section 3
provides the plaintiff the option of bringing suit in the small claims division
or in the concurrent civil court. 191 Section 4 is designed to protect defen-
dants from being sued in an inconvenient forum, a problem especially im-
portant to defendants sued on contracts resulting from door-to-door and
mail-order practices.
192
Sections 5 and 6 provide for informal pleadings, service of process, and
counterclaims. 1 93 Section 7 provides that a speedy trial will be available
in small claims courts by providing for a hearing within thirty days, unless
the defendant has not been served at least five days prior to the appearance
date. Section 8 provides for fees to be charged only for filing and service of
process. Although fees are not specified, they should be kept to a minimum.
This section also provides that payment of fees may be waived upon evi-
dence of the plaintiff's inability to pay.'
94
To keep the proceedings informal and inexpensive, section 9 provides
that there shall be no trial by jury in the small claims court' 95 and section
10 provides that no attorney shall take part in the small claims proceed-
ings.'9 6 Since the model act excludes attorneys, clerks and legal para-
professionals should be available to assist individual litigants. 197 Section 1 1
provides for such assistance. To prevent abuse of the small claims courts,
section 12 provides for mass filing limitations and exclusion of those who
abuse small claims procedures. 198
Since many small claims can be resolved by informal mediation, sec-
tion 13 provides for arbitration and conciliation proceedings. 199 Section
14 limits the removal option to claims involving complex points of law
and claims involving multiple parties. 200 To prevent delays, section 15
limits the granting of continuances to a showing of good cause. 201 Section
16 provides that proceedings should be free from the technicalities of
procedural rules, but decisions should be reached in accordance with rules
of substantive law.
202
Section 17 provides procedural safeguards in the granting of default
judgments by requiring a plaintiff to present evidence to prove a claim
before a default judgment is entered and to allow default judgments to be
190 See notes 34-54 and accompanying text supra.
191 See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
192 See notes 117-23 and accompanying text supra.
193 See notes 124-29, 146 and accompanying texts supra.
194 See notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra.
195 See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
196 See notes 89-101 and accompanying text supra.
197 See notes 102-05 and accompanying text supra.
198 See notes 71-76 and accompanying text supra.
199 See notes 132-41 and accompanying text supra.
200 See notes 142-47 and accompanying text supra.
201 See notes 156-59 and accompanying text supra.
202 See notes 148-55 and accompanying text supra.
SPRING 1976]
Journal of Law Reform
reopened for good cause within sixty days.20 3 Section 18 provides that
judgments may be paid in installments and that the court may authorize
execution upon failure of a litigant to pay.20 4 Section 19 provides that the
costs of the action will be awarded to the prevailing party. Appeals from
the small claims judgment may be taken according to section 20 to the
civil court with concurrent jurisdiction.20 5 These features should be statu-
torily adopted to provide for effective small claims courts in every juris-
diction.
Funds allocated to the improvement of small claims courts would be
well spent. Unfair and deceptive practices in the marketplace should de-
cline substantially if consumers are given realistic grievance machinery
to protect their interests, 206 and small claims courts can provide an effec-
tive mechanism for the redress of consumer grievances and other small
claims. Properly designed and funded, these courts can provide a forum
for speedy, fair, inexpensive, and convenient dispute resolution.
APPENDIX
MODEL SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACT
Section 1 Small claims division; judges
A small claims division is established in each [district]20 7 as a division
of the [district court]. Judges of the [district court] are the judges of the
small claims division.
Section 2 Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the small claims court shall extend to all civil actions,
other than actions for injunctive relief, brought by any person [, association,
corporation, or other legal entity] 20 8 where the amount involved, exclusive
of costs, does not exceed [$500-$ 1,000].
-' 9
Section 3 Jurisdiction of the [district court]
The small claims division shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
[district court].
Section 4 Venue
Actions shall be brought in the judicial [district] where the action arises
or where the defendant lives, is regularly employed, or has an office for
the transaction of business. Actions brought in other [districts] may be
heard in the [district] in which the action is brought only if the defendant
203See notes 160-73 and accompanying text supra.
204 See notes 182-86 and accompanying text supra.
205 See notes 174-81 and accompanying text supra.
206S. REP. No. 93-1164, supra note 15, at 26.
207 If "district" is not an appropriate designation for the civil court with plenary
jurisdiction, the appropriate designation should replace "district" here and in the
other instances where "district" is bracketed in the Act.
208 The bracketed provision should be included only where there is no statutory
definition of person in the general rules of construction that would include the
specified organizational forms.
209The amount in controversy should be between $500 and $1,000 at the option
of a particular jurisdiction.
[VOL.. 9: 590
Small Claims Courts
appears and waives venue. The court, on its own motion, or on motion
of either party, may transfer the cause to a more convenient [district].
Section 5 Pleadings; service of process
a. No formal pleadings shall be necessary. A claimant must prepare a
complaint which adequately informs the defendant of the nature of the
claim.
b. Service of the complaint upon the defendant shall be by registered or
certified mail with return receipt requested from the addressee. If return
receipt shows that there has not been effective service, the court may direct
that service on the defendant be completed by personal service.
Section 6 Other formal pleadings; counterclaims
a. The defendant need-not file an answer.
b. If the defendant has a claim against the plaintiff, a counterclaim or
demand for setoff may be asserted. Whenever a defendant asserts a claim
beyond the scope of the small claims division's jurisdiction, the defendant
may reserve the right to pursue the claim in a court of competent juris-
diction or to demand judgment on the claim not exceeding the jurisdictional
amount waiving the right to bring an action in a court of competent juris-
diction for the amount in excess thereof.
Section 7 Time for appearance; order for plaintifi to appear
The date for the appearance of the defendant shall not be more than 30
days or less than 10 days from the date of filing. If the complaint is not
served upon the defendant at least 5 days prior to the appearance date, the
clerk shall set a new date for the appearance of the defendant which shall be
not more than 30 days or less than 10 days from the date of the issuance of
the new notice and the clerk shall inform both parties thereof. When the
date for appearance is fixed, the plaintiff shall be informed of said date and
ordered to appear.
Section 8 Fees
Fees shall be levied for filing and service of process. [The fees charged
will be the same as those in the district court.] 210 The judge may waive
prepayment or payment of fees upon the plaintiff's sworn statement or
evidence of the inability to pay, fees.
Section 9 No trial by jury
There shall be no trial by jury in the small claims division. Trial by jury
may be had on appeal.
Section 10 No attorney to take part
No attorney at law or other person than the plaintiff and defendant shall
take any part in the prosecution or defense of litigation in the small claims
division. Either party may present witnesses at any small claims proceeding.
Section 11 Staff assistance to individuals
The court staff shall assist individual litigants in the use of the small
210 This is an optional section.
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claims division including but not limited to helping in the preparation of
claims and providing any other necessary information.
Section 12 Limitations on the right to resort to the small claims procedure
a. Not more than 6 claims may be filed in the small claims division by
a single person [, firm or corporation] within any 30 day period.
b. If the court believes that the procedures of the small claims division
are sought to be utilized by a claimant for purposes of oppression or
harassment, including but not limited to a claimant having previously
resorted to the procedure for claims based on fraudulent or unfair trade
practices, seeking to circumvent court rules, or filing a colorless claim,
after affording the claimant an opportunity for a hearing, the court may
enter an order prohibiting the claimant from using the small claims
procedure.
Section 13 Arbitration and conciliation
The small claims division may establish procedures for arbitration and
conciliation to be used at the consent of the parties. A judge or an attorney
appointed by the court may act as an arbitrator or conciliation referee
provided that a judge who has acted as a conciliation referee may not
serve as judge in any further proceedings in the same case.
Section 14 Removal
The court may transfer the action to the [district court] upon the motion
of either party or that of the court if the court determines that complex
points of law are involved or that the claim involves multiple parties.
Section 15 Continuance
A continuance shall not be granted except for good cause or with the
consent of both parties.
Section 16 Informal procedures
The proceedings under this Act shall be informal. The court shall not be
bound by the statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, plead-
ings or evidence [except for the provisions relating to privileged communi-
cations]. 211 The court shall decide claims to achieve substantial justice ac-
cording to the rules of substantive law.
Section 17 Default judgments
If the defendant fails to appear at the hearing and proper notice is
established by a signed return receipt or a return of service, the court
shall enter a default judgment only if, upon inquiry, plaintiff has attempted
and failed to settle the claim by informal means and plaintiff presents
evidence to support the claim. The court may vacate the default judgment
within 60 days of judgment for good cause and shall reset the claim for
hearing.
Section 18 Judgment; enforcement of judgment
a. The court may provide for the satisfaction of any judgment by pay-
211 This is an optional section.
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ment to the clerk or the plaintiff either in a lump sum or in installments.
The judgment authorizing payment of installments may be modified at any
time for good cause.
b. Where the defendant has not paid according to the terms of the
judgment, the court may authorize execution as it is available in the [dis-
trict court]. Failure to pay a judgment is not the basis for a contempt
citation.
Section 19 Costs
The costs for filing and sending notice shall be awarded to the prevail-
ing party. No other costs shall be allowed either party except by special
order of the court.
Section 20 Appeals
Either party may appeal an adverse judgment to the [district court].
The same fee as is charged on an original filing in the [district court] shall
be paid by the appellant. On appeal the action shall be tried the same as
an original action in the [district court]. If the judgment against the appellant
is not substantially reduced or reversed, the court, in addition to other costs,
shall require the appellant to pay reasonable attorney's fees to the ap-
pellee.
-Alexander Domanskis
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